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1 Introduction
Although economists have generated a substantial amount of research on work incentives, their
approach remains at odds with much of the management and organization literature on the
subject. The logic of using money to induce effort, which is the main focus of economic analysis,
is definitely a key feature of actual incentive packages. Yet, a mere description of monetary
incentive schemes falls short of providing a full account of management practices. Even in cases
where direct monetary incentives are used extensively, they are associated with other types of
benefits ranging from travel or goods to symbolic rewards. It is for instance a common practice
to grant top sales people medals, rings, sculptures, plaques and so on, handed out during lavish
ceremonies (see Nelson 1994). It is often argued that goods, although a poor substitute for
money according to standard economic theory, are an effective means of providing incentives due
to their trophy value: they remind the winner and others of her/his successful past performance.
Wood (1998) quotes Will Haffer vice-president of sales with Bowne publishing, reminiscing about
winning a large screen TV: Actually the main reason I wanted it was that it was the top prize.
I could afford to buy a big screen but it was not the same as winning it.
Whereas the above examples suggest that there are some benefits in stressing differences
between employees, the opposite point is often made that it is appropriate to adopt an egalitarian
approach by expunging symbolic differences (see Pfeffer, 1994). A substantial body of research
has emerged in the wake of Adams (1965) on the impact of unequal or unfair treatment on
work motivation. According to Adams' equity theory, people react to inequity by making up for
it. For instance, they lower their input if they feel that what they obtain in return is insufficient
relative to others around them.1 While status differences are enjoyed by those with a high status,
they are disliked by those with a low status who, as a result, lose motivation. Hence, recognition
should not be viewed as a cheap substitute for money. It has a cost because it is valued in
relative terms: what matters is earning more recognition than others. In the present paper we
propose a simple framework in which the desirability of using status to stress differences between
1For economic arguments against large pay differences see Milgrom (1988) and Lazear (1989).
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organization members can be assessed.
Typically, sociologists refer to social status as capturing the need for social recognition. As
defined by Weber (1922), social status is an effective claim to social esteem in terms of negative
or positive privileges. He insists that a status ranking is not directly related to wealth or income,
although it may be affected by them. Thus, Veblen's theory (1899), in which status stems mostly
from relative income or wealth, is somewhat restrictive. 2 An opposite argument could actually
be made for reverse causality: higher status is the basis for earning higher income. There is some
experimental evidence, both from psychologists (Jemmott and Gonzalez, 1989) and economists
(Ball and Eckel, 1996, Ball and Eckel, 1998, and Ball, Eckel, Grossman and Zame, 2001) that an
exogenous and random distribution of status among individuals has a significant impact on their
relative performance.3 Belliveau et al. (1996) study how CEO compensation is affected by the
CEO's status relative to that of the compensation committee chair. They find that high status
CEOs matched with low status compensation chairs are significantly better paid than low status
CEOs matched with high status compensation chairs.
We consider a multi-agent moral hazard problem and allow for an agent's preferences to
depend directly on her status as well as income and effort. There is not much debate among
economists over the fact that individuals care about status. There is however some discussion
over the proper modeling strategy. Letting social status be an argument of the utility function
is what Postlewaite (1998) calls the "direct" approach. This may be traced back to Frank
(1984)4 and has found its most compelling support in the evolutionary argument developed by
Fershtman and Weiss (1998). The proponents of an alternative instrumental approach, where
2Empirically, there is obviously a strong correlation between social status and material well-being. There is for
instance a clear positive correlation between the ranking of occupations in term of social status by respondents in
surveys and the average income in these occupations. However, the status ranking of occupations may be much
better explained if education is added to income as an explanatory variable (see Perrot, 1999). See the survey by
Weiss and Fershtman (1998) for references on the implications of Veblen's theory in economic models.
3Ball et al. (2001) created status by arbitrarily awarding a gold star (a pin) to half of the subjects. All the
subjects then played a standard buyer/seller game (oral double auction). Status was found to be a significantly
positive (and unconscious the gold star was never mentioned in the strategy the players reported following)
determinant of a subject's earnings. The result held whether it was clear or not to the participants that the gold
star was awarded on an arbitrary basis.
4In the pioneering work of Frank (1984), status is derived from the ranking of relative income. This assumption,
which is natural when dealing with macro-economic problems such as growth, consumption and saving, is not
appropriate when focusing on internal labor markets. Firms differentiate employees' status through other means
than relative income (e.g., the hierarchical structure). In fact wages are rarely public information in firms.
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status indirectly affects an individual's consumption level, criticize the direct approach as lacking
robustness: the results are sensitive to the specification of preferences (see Postlewaite, 1998). In
Section 2 we argue in favor of preferences which are characterized by a complementarity between
status and income: high-status agents are willing to exert more effort in exchange for additional
income while better paid agents are willing to exert more effort in exchange for improved status.
As sociologists would put it, agents exhibit a taste for status congruence.
Organizations may grant recognition to their members through various formal sources of
status: the wage distribution, the distribution of scarce non-monetary resources (such as offices,
furniture, computers, locker rooms, and dining facilities), conspicuous awards or, most commonly,
positions in the organization's hierarchy. Although some of these attributes clearly provide
material benefits (more independence, greater influence, better work conditions), many others
are symbolic and their value to employees stems mostly from the social or psychological benefits
they entail (self esteem or social recognition). Here we ignore material benefits and consider the
pure status ranking that might ensue, for instance, from the ranking of positions in a formal
hierarchy. The choice of status allocation in a hierarchy is constrained by the production process
(i.e. the technology). Yet there are many instances of firms in the same industry resorting to
different hierarchies despite possessing similar production technologies. For instance in the auto
industry Toyota has seven layers of management between its CEO and the employees on the
factory floor, whereas Ford has seventeen and GM has as many as twenty two (see Milgrom and
Roberts, 1992). Using a panel of 300 US firms over the years 1986-1999, Rajan and Wulf (2003)
find a significant trend towards a reduction in the number of management layers over the period,
controlling for various variables pertaining to the firm's structure, and in particular its size. This
suggests that firms are to an extent able to adjust their hierarchies, and that this ability may be
used to provide work incentives. In order to underline the relationship between status and work
incentives we abstract from the technical role played by the hierarchy and leave the principal a
great deal of latitude to act as a social engineer.
Leaving technology to one side, the principal still faces two categories of constraints. First,
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the status bestowed upon agents should be deemed legitimate in order to significantly affect
their behavior. Our results show that, for incentive purposes, the principal will only choose to
award different status levels to agents who have had different past performance: thus legitimacy
may reasonably be rooted in these performance differences. Our focus is rather on the second
constraint that arises because status is enjoyed through interpersonal comparisons. Regardless of
the method used to grant social recognition, its value is perceived in relative terms. For instance,
when status is derived from a person's position in a formal hierarchy, increasing one agent's
status necessarily improves her position in the hierarchy relative to others who will mechanically
suffer some loss. In other words, status in organizations is a scarce resource.
Our results show that career profiles differ greatly according to whether the employer may
commit to long-term incentive schemes. In a short term interaction with no commitment, the
employer chooses to introduce limited status differentiation, which usually translates into a
relatively flat hierarchy. Monetary compensation is performance-based, so that wages reflect
productivity differences. Indeed, in one-shot work relations, status may not be handed out as a
reward for good past performance. The relevant question is then whether an employer would ex
ante choose to differentiate status amongst a priori identical workers. The answer is no. Although
agents with high status are more responsive to monetary incentives, the resulting benefits are
outweighed by the reduced work motivation for those with lower status. This short-term result
emphasizes the cost of status differentiation stigmatized in the human resource management
literature.
In order to introduce benefits from differentiation, we adopt a long-term perspective and
consider an organization comprised of overlapping generations of agents. We find that it is
optimal to give young agents as low a status as possible along with no monetary incentives. Their
work motivation stems solely from promotion prospects. For incentive purposes promotions bring
more substantial rewards for those who have been more successful in the past: they end up with
prestigious positions and are paid above their marginal product. Because individual preferences
exhibit complementarities between status and money, symbolic and material rewards reinforce
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each other. By concentrating both types of compensation in the same time period and in the
same state of nature, the organization exploits their complementarity so as to reduce the total
wage bill. Although this differential treatment of older employees reduces instantaneous profits,
this loss is more than compensated by the benefits associated with sharper incentives for junior
employees. In other words an employer who is able to commit organizes an internal labor market
where pay is attached to jobs, rewards are delayed in time and higher incomes are associated
with greater recognition (e.g. a higher rank in the hierarchy). Whereas wage differences are
small early on in the career they become substantially larger than productivity differences as
tenure rises. We show that these results are robust to the introduction of income risk aversion, a
case for which a standard repeated moral hazard model would prescribe smoothed consumption
over time (see for instance Rogerson, 1985, Chiappori et al., 1994).
More complicated issues would arise were we to take into account equilibrium status alloca-
tions with multiple organizations. For instance Fershtman, Hvide and Weiss (2005) consider a
model with competitive firms, each comprising one principal and two agents, where workers have
the same productivity but different status concerns. They analyze the impact of cultural diver-
sity in the work place on labor market equilibrium.5 Performing a similar equilibrium analysis
for large corporations is challenging because large firms use their market power to shield their
employees from market pressures.6 As a first step the present paper focuses on internal labor
markets.
We present the static setting in Section 2 where we describe the organization, agents' prefer-
ences and the allocation of status among agents; we also establish that optimal short-term incen-
tives involve no differentiation in status among agents. The overlapping generations framework
is introduced in Section 3, where we show that promotions are optimal if long-term commitment
is feasible. Section 4 illustrates the empirical relevance of our theoretical findings through a
5They show that when status, which is based on wage comparisons, is derived locally (i.e., within the firm)
firms choose to mix workers to enhance 'cultural trade'. This policy increases total output and wage dispersion.
In contrast, when some workers care about global status (i.e., they compare wages with a reference group outside
the firm) while others care about local status, segregation may arise.
6This is true only to a certain extent. For instance Lazear and Oyer (2004), exploiting Swedish data, show
that in the long term wages are determined externally, presumably reflecting centralized bargaining.
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comparison of work relations in the US and Japan, and Section 5 compares our approach to
some related literature on work incentives. We finally provide concluding remarks in Section 6.
2 The cost of status manipulation
We consider the provision of work incentives to agents whose effort level is unobservable. If, as is
usually assumed, an agent's preferences are fully characterized by a taste for money and a distaste
for effort, incentives may be provided through monetary rewards and penalties. As we argued
in the introduction, actual incentive procedures typically involve many non-monetary attributes
that are valued mostly as signs of a greater workplace recognition. We use the concept of status
to summarize the overall access to the psychological or social benefits that an employee may
secure through her position in the organization. In this section we describe the static framework
and show that it is costly to differentiate status between organization members when the work
relationship is short term.
2.1 The organization
The organization (bureau, subdivision, firm) is supervised by a risk-neutral principal. There are
n ≥ 2 workers indexed by i = 1, ..., n. These are ex ante identical individuals, hired to do the
same type of work, so that there is no a priori legitimate motive for treating them differently.
The principal aims to maximize expected profit, with profit pi being defined by
pi(Q,w1, ...wn) = Q−
n∑
i=1
wi. (1)
where Q =
∑n
i=1 qi is total output (with a price normalized to 1) and wi is agent i's wage.
Each worker contributes to the collective outcome by exerting effort ei ≥ 0. The harder agent
i works (the higher ei is), the greater is the probability of high output. Formally, individual i's
output qi may be either high qi = q, with probability µ(ei) or low qi = q, with probability
1− µ(ei) (q > q > 0). Individual output, and thus absolute performance, is verifiable. This is a
case where direct individual monetary incentives are particularly appropriate. The probability
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of high performance for agent i increases with ei at a decreasing rate. The function µ(.) is also
assumed to be three times continuously differentiable with a strictly negative third derivative. 7
Assumption 1 µ′(e) > 0, µ′′(e) < 0, µ′′′(e) < 0 for e ≥ 0, lime→+∞ µ′(e) = 0.
We next discuss in some detail the two novel ingredients of our framework: employee prefer-
ences and the allocation of status in the organization.
2.1.1 Employees' preferences
A key feature of our approach is the specification of agents' preferences, which assumes some
complementarity between status and income. We posit the following utility function:
u(w, s, e) = sw − ψ(e), s ≥ 0, w ≥ 0, e ≥ 0. (2)
where s is status, w is wage income and e is effort. The disutility of work, ψ, is taken to be a
strictly increasing, strictly convex and twice continuously-differentiable function, with a strictly
positive third derivative.8
Assumption 2 ψ′(e) > 0 ψ′′(e) > 0 ψ′′′(e) > 0 for e ≥ 0.
This specification reflects in a simple manner agents' taste for money and status and their
distaste for effort. Setting status equal to 1 yields, as a special case, the standard quasi-linear
utility, so that our results may be readily compared with the predictions in the standard moral
hazard framework. Linearity with respect to wage indicates that agents are risk neutral regarding
income. In subsequent sections, we discuss how our results may be affected if this assumption is
relaxed.9 The requirement that status and wages be positive is a normalization. Utility could
easily be rewritten to allow for non-zero lower bounds. The important point is that there are
such lower bounds.
7This condition, along with some similar conditions on preferences in Assumption 2, ensures the convexity of
the agent's optimal effort with respect to work incentives.
8See footnote 7.
9The interpretation of linearity with respect to status is provided in section 3.
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Since income and status are both positively valued, the indifference curves relating these two
variables for a given effort level are strictly decreasing. This reflects substitution between status
and income. However, preferences over status and income are strictly convex so that there is
not perfect substitution between these two variables: a prestigious title does not compensate
for the absence of wages, nor does a good wage make up for the contempt of others. Utility
also has important implications for the income-effort and status-effort tradeoffs. Formally, the
marginal rate of substitution between effort and income is decreasing in status while the marginal
rate of substitution between effort and status is decreasing in income. These cross effects may
be best interpreted by relating them to the psychological analysis of work motivation and the
conventional wisdom prevailing among management practitioners.
We first consider the impact of a change in status on the income/effort tradeoff. Our speci-
fication of preferences implies that, for a given level of monetary incentives, an agent should be
all the more willing to exert effort when she has higher status. The literature on job satisfaction
suggests that a higher status enhances work commitment. On the one hand, status is closely
related to the need for recognition which has been found to be a key factor in job satisfaction
(e.g. Dunette, Campbell and Hakel, 1967). On the other hand, many studies have shown that
low job satisfaction results in high turnover and absenteeism rates. 10 Tahlin (1999) found in a
study on job mobility in Sweden that, all else equal, people with low status (i.e., a low prestige
score according to Treiman, 1977) are more likely to make voluntary job shifts than people with
high status. It should be expected that low satisfaction also results in shirking which, contrary
to absence and resignation, is not readily observable. 11
We now examine how the trade-off between effort and status is affected by individual income.
According to our specification of preferences, richer agents care more about their status in the
sense that they are willing to exert more effort in order to improve it. The hierarchy of needs
proposed by Maslow (1954) provides a nice interpretation of this phenomenon. Maslow argues
10See for instance Day and Hamblin (1964), Baum and Youngblood (1975).
11Many studies have shown that there is a positive correlation between job satisfaction and quality of services
(see Varma et al., 1999). A positive effect of status on productivity has been found by Greenberg (1988) in a
study on office reallocation.
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that there is a five-level hierarchy of human needs, with the following ranking from bottom to top:
physiological needs, safety needs, social needs, esteem needs and self-actualization needs. Higher-
level needs correspond to less material (more psychological) preoccupations. A person develops a
taste for higher-level needs only after fulfilling those at lower levels. In the present context, income
is the means of fulfilling material satisfaction, while status is the means of fulfilling psychological
satisfaction. Then, individuals with low income are mostly preoccupied with material needs and
care little about status, while those with higher income, having satisfied their material needs,
are mostly concerned about increasing their status. Various observations, either in the work
place or in broader social contexts, illustrate the relevance of Maslow's construction. Certers
and Bugertal (1966) find evidence that factors at the top of Maslow's hierarchy play a more
important role for employees earning higher wages. This is consistent with the logic applied by
practitioners when they use non-monetary compensation. A human resource management guide
indicates that using goods to reward employees is inappropriate for those earning low wages,
while such prizes are highly valued by those who are paid sufficiently well (see Nelson, 1994).
Similarly, rich people seeking social recognition through the funding of a charity or fine arts
reflects such a shift in tastes caused by higher income. 12
The next section describes how the organization may decide to allocate status amongst agents.
2.1.2 Status in the organization
Social status is a scarce resource because it is valued in relative terms. In order to model its
scarcity let us define s = (s1, ..., sn) as a status allocation in a feasibility set S ⊂ IRn+, where the
ith component measures the status of agent i. The scarcity of status is reflected by the property
that it is not possible to improve one agent's status without reducing some other agent's status.
The feasibility set S is therefore analogous to a Pareto frontier. Secondly, individuals being ex
ante identical, the feasibility set should satisfy an anonymity condition: if a status allocation
12For instance children with high-income parents typically select high-status positions (see Treiman and Ganze-
boom, 1990 and Lillard and Reville, 1997). On a more anecdotal note, Cornelius Vanderbilt Whitney earning a
Ph.D. for the sheer pleasure of being referred to as Doctor Whitney illustrates this appetite for status among rich
people (see Fussell, 1983).
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is feasible, then any permutation of this allocation is also feasible. Finally, we assume that
the status feasibility set is convex. Scarcity and anonymity together with convexity, imply that
feasible status allocations must satisfy the following linear constraint: 13
(F)
n∑
i=1
si − n = 0, s ∈ IRn+.
That overall status sums up to n is a normalization: any other strictly positive constant
would produce the same results. However, n has the convenient property that, when no status
disparity is introduced, all agents have status 1, so that our results may easily be compared to
those from the classical moral hazard literature with quasi-linear individual preferences. 14
Finally we assume that, contrary to wages, status is awarded before the agent exerts effort.
The status of an agent is based on her situation within the organization, typically her position in
the hierarchy, in a given period. This is consistent with our interpretation of preferences, where
recognition induces work satisfaction which in turn induces greater responsiveness to monetary
incentives. Any attempt by the principal to reallocate status once work has been completed,
for instance by awarding a medal to employees who have performed well, will only affect agents'
status in future periods, all the more so if they remain in the same organization.
Before characterizing the optimal short-term incentive scheme, we briefly describe a bench-
mark first-best solution.
2.2 First-best allocation
We now discuss the optimal incentive scheme in the first-best situation where each agent may fully
commit to a contractible effort level as well as to unconditional participation in the organization.
This first-best analysis is meant to provide intuition about the solution that the principal would
ideally prefer, rather than to make a statement about the welfare implications of our setup. Since
the only binding constraint is the agents' ex-ante participation constraint, it is optimal for the
13The linear functional form is a consequence of the convexity assumption. It is somewhat restrictive and is
designed to facilitate the exposition of the results (especially in the optimization problem). Some discussion of
the robustness of our results to more general functional forms is provided in Section 3.
14Here status may be adjusted continuously (preferences are defined for a continuous variable). In contrast
Dubey and Geanakoplos (2004) study the relative merits of absolute versus relative rewards in providing incentives
when preferences are defined only over status rankings.
11
principal to offer each agent participation in a lottery where one sole winner receives all of the
status and is the only employee paid, whereas all agents commit to exert the same first-best level
of effort. The main argument in the proof is that, instead of having two agents with positive
status, the joint status could be given to only one of them, with each receiving this total status
with some probability. The added status for each agent when she is paid exactly compensates
her for the lower probability of being paid. This allows the firm to pay each agent less often,
thus lowering the expected wage bill.15 Because of the complementarities between status and
income, it is optimal to concentrate status and monetary compensations on one individual so as
to lower the total wage bill. We might think that the optimality of a lottery depends on income
risk-neutrality or on the linearity of the status feasibility constraint. It turns out that this result
is quite robust.16
Actual work relations allow for much less commitment on the part of the agent than that
which was postulated here. We therefor investigate the implications of our model in more realistic
settings. We first reconsider the static problem.
2.3 Optimal short-term incentives
Real world work relations typically involve a moral hazard problem since effort levels are not
perfectly verifiable. Furthermore, the ability of an agent to commit is limited by work legislation
which usually outlaws clauses that would prevent her from quitting at any time. The moral
hazard problem and the agent's lack of commitment translate into incentive-compatibility con-
straints and interim-participation constraints respectively. The information structure of a static
relationship is as follows:
Stage 1 : the principal offers contracts stipulating each agent's status and wages;
Stage 2: agents choose whether or not to participate;
15The lottery divides the total wage bill by n relative to what it would have been were agents to have had
identical status with probability 1. The individual probability of winning the lottery is 1
n
. The prize is swin = n
and wwin = U + ψ(e∗) where e∗ is the first best effort level (i.e. which solves ψ′(e) = µ′(e)∆q). With such a
lottery individual expected utility is U , each agent commits to effort level e∗ and the total wage bill is U +ψ(e∗),
as compared to n
(
U + ψ(e∗)
)
when agents have identical status and all receive a wage with probability 1.
16A lottery is still optimal if utility is linear in one argument and either the agent is risk averse regarding
income, or utility is strictly concave in status. See section 3 for related arguments.
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Stage 3: interim information (the draw of a lottery, if any) is revealed and agents choose whether
to quit or not;
Stage 4: agents choose their effort levels;
Stage 5: outputs are observed and payments are made.
The new constraints are a consequence of stages 3 and 4. The interim stage 3 may seem unnatural
in this context and is solely introduced for the sake of comparability with the first-best solution by
allowing for lotteries before the task is carried out. The lottery in the first-best contract violates
both the interim-participation constraint of stage 3 and the incentive-compatibility constraint of
stage 4.17
At stage 5, status is already determined from stage 3. As in the classical principal/agent
setup there is no point in running lotteries over monetary rewards alone. Payments may however
depend on output. Let wi be agent i's fixed salary and ∆wi be agent i's bonus in case of
high performance (i.e., wi + ∆wi and wi are agent i's wages associated with outputs q and q
respectively). Worker i chooses her effort so as to maximize:
EUi =
(
µ(ei)∆wi + wi
)
si − ψ(ei). (3)
Under assumptions 1 and 2, the agent's utility is strictly concave in effort and therefore has
a unique maximum point. Agent i's optimal effort, e∗(si∆wi), solves the following first-order
condition,
ψ′(e∗(si∆wi))
µ′(e∗(si∆wi))
= si∆wi. (4)
Standard comparative statics shows that, from the concavity of µ and the convexity of ψ, e∗ is
increasing in si∆wi. Effort is independent of wi due to income risk neutrality. Moreover, as can
be seen from Equation (A1) in Appendix A, the sign restrictions on the third derivatives of µ
and ψ ensure that e∗ is concave.
17It is a priori less obvious whether the added constraints rule out lotteries altogether. Proposition 2 shows
that they in fact do.
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Taking into account additional constraints, the principal's program may be written as
maxE
n∑
i=1
{
µ(ei)(∆q −∆wi)− wi + q
}
(5)
subject to
n∑
i=1
si = n, with probability 1, (6)
si[µ(ei)∆wi + wi]− ψ(ei) ≥ U ∀ i = 1, ..., n, with probability 1, (7)
ei = e∗(si∆wi) ∀ i = 1, ..., n with probability 1. (8)
We omit ex ante participation constraints since they are implied by interim-participation con-
straints. The following proposition states three conditions that should hold in an optimal allo-
cation and which, in short, say that higher status goes hand-in-hand with higher income.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, an optimal solution has the following properties with
probability 1.
(i) ∆wi ≤ ∆q ∀i = 1, ..., n.
(ii) ∆wi = ∆q or wi = 0 ∀i = 1, ..., n.
(iii) si < sj if and only if wi = wj = 0 and ∆wi < ∆wj , or wi < wj .
Proof : See Appendix A.
Part (i) is the standard result that there is no point in the principal providing more than
full incentives. Part (ii) is also quite standard: given that the agent is risk neutral over income,
the principal abstains from giving full incentives only when she is restricted in the choice of the
low performance wage. The novel insight appears in part (iii). This states that agents with
different status either receive different low performance wages (the higher status agent being
better paid) or receive different incentives (the larger high performance reward going to the
higher status agent). That is, different status levels imply unequal treatment in monetary as
well as symbolic rewards. This logic is exploited fully in the first-best solution, where all of
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the status and money is concentrated on one agent. This enables the principal to reduce the
wage bill by taking advantage of the complementarity between status and income in the agent's
preferences. However, as the following proposition shows, the lack of commitment on the agents'
part makes unequal treatment among agents suboptimal.
Proposition 2 (symbolic egalitarianism) Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, in order to maximize
instantaneous profit, it is optimal to give identical agents identical contracts (same status, same
compensation scheme).
Proof : See Appendix A.
Assumption 3 is a technical condition that is provided in the Appendix and which is used
to establish the result when limited liability constraints may be binding. As we now show, it is
quite straightforward to establish the result when limited liability does not bind. Consider the
case where at least one agent, i, receives a strictly positive low performance wage. Then it is easy
to show that if some other agent's status differs from that of agent i, profit may be increased. To
see this, note that (iii) in Proposition 1 implies that the agent with the larger status necessarily
has a strictly larger expected utility (which is therefore strictly above U). Moreover her low
performance wage must be strictly positive since it is at least as large as that of agent i (see
(iii) in Proposition 1). Hence the low performance wage of the agent with higher status may be
decreased without violating her incentive constraint nor her individual rationality constraint so
that profit would increase. The situation where the principal chooses to give strictly positive low
performance wages arises when U is large enough, namely when18
U > µ(e∗(∆q))∆q − ψ(e∗(∆q)). (9)
Appendix A analyzes the case where U is low so that limited liability may be binding.
The argument above uses the property that status and wages are substitutes in the agent's
utility so that, if status differs across agents, the principal may save on wages by paying those
18This lower bound is obtained as follows. The status of the agent getting the worst treatment may not exceed
1. Since, from (i) in Proposition 1, monetary incentives may not exceed ∆q, if (9) holds, her individual rationality
constraint requires that she receives a strictly positive low performance wage. From our previous argument all
agents must therefore have status equal to 1. Then (ii) in Proposition 1 implies that all agents be rewarded ∆q
for high performance.
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agents with higher status less. This however conflicts with the result established in Proposition
1 that, if status and wages can be adjusted jointly, they should be used as complements. It is
therefore never optimal to differentiate status across agents.
Proposition 2 is a first formulation using economic tools of the equity theory in social psy-
chology, according to which it is harmful to introduce differences between workers performing
identical tasks (see Adams, 1965). Indeed, hierarchical differences among workers are an obstacle
to communication, cooperation, and commitment for those who are in lower positions. Pfeffer
(1994) argues that symbolic egalitarianism is a key feature of human resource management
in successful companies. He describes examples such as the car manufacturer NUMMI, where
the executive dining room has been eliminated, or the manager of the contract manufacturer
Selectron giving up his/her private office. The well-documented story of Nucor Corporation is
another striking illustration (see Ghemawat, 1995). The success of the company, which is known
for profitability far above that of the rest of the Steel industry, cannot be explained by technolog-
ical advantage (its technology is similar to that of most of its competitors). It is in fact due to its
innovative human resource management. In line with the results of Proposition 2, external signs
of hierarchical differences are systematically eliminated (no personal secretary, common parking
lot, everybody flying economy class, and so on). Moreover the number of layers in the executive
hierarchy has been restricted to 4, as against a dozen on average for the rest of the industry.
Nucor relies on direct monetary rewards to provide work incentives. The average Nucor salary
is comparable to the average salary of its competitors, but its structure is more incentive-based.
In a short-term relationship only technological constraints motivate the introduction of hier-
archies. We now turn to the study of incentive schemes in long-term work relationships.
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3 Status and promotions
3.1 Overlapping generations in the organization
Work relationships between individuals and organizations are in general medium to long term. 19
As workers stay longer than one period within the organization, the principal has more instru-
ments than in the previous section to provide work incentives. She can indeed replicate the
static contract, but she can also propose an intertemporal incentive scheme that links future
rewards to past performance. We study this problem within an overlapping generations set-up
with an infinite horizon. At each date, the organization comprises two generations: the young
(juniors) who enter the organization in the current period and the old (seniors) who joined the
organization in the previous period and who will not be around in the next one. Hence each
cohort stays for only two periods. Lotteries are ruled out and we assume that the principal is
able to commit. Finally we restrict the analysis to equitable contracts: all young agents at period
t are offered the same two-period contract. Thus identical agents (i.e. with identical résumés)
receive identical treatment. Proposition 2 suggests that this restriction is reasonable. 20 The
timing for a cohort joining the organization at date t is as follows.
Date t:
Stage 1 - the new cohort is offered contracts stipulating a starting status, a monetary incentive
scheme and a promotion system (future status and wages depending on past performance);
Stage 2 - agents choose whether or not to participate;
Stage 3 - agents choose effort based on current monetary incentives and status, as well as pro-
motion prospects;
Stage 4 - outputs are observed, transfers and promotions occur;
Date t+ 1:
Stage 5 - agents choose whether to stay or to leave;
19For more on this see Milgrom and Roberts (1992).
20Internal equity, which fulfills the requirement of status legitimacy, is often mandatory by law. For instance
in France it is against the law to pay identical jobs differently. The rule is "à travail égal, salaire égal" (articles
L.133-5, 4ème alinéa and L.136-2, 8ème alinéa in the Code du Travail). Firms have been prosecuted for violating
this rule.
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Stage 6 - workers choose an effort level according to their current monetary incentive and status
(which may depend on how successful they were in the first period);
Stage 7 - outputs are observed, transfers occur, workers retire.
Stage 5 implies that, as is the case in actual work contracts, an agent may not commit for two
periods. Hence an individual rationality constraint for old agents must be imposed.
Each agent's intertemporal utility is additively separable with a discount factor of δ < 1.21
The expected utility of an old agent exerting effort ept whose past performance has been p ∈ {l, h}
(l stands for low and h for high) is as in equation 3:
EUpt =
[
µ(ept)∆wpt + wpt
]
spt − ψ(ept). (10)
A young agent's expected intertemporal utility for effort e1t is
EU1t = s1t
[
µ(e1t)∆w1t + w1t
]− ψ(e1t) + δ[µ(e1t)∆Ut+1 + EUl(t+1)]. (11)
where ∆Ut = EUht − EUlt. Individual rationality constraints are:
(IR') EUpt ≥ U , p ∈ {h, l} and EU1t ≥ (1 + δ)U.
Let e∗ be implicitly defined by equation (4). It is easy to check that the incentive-compatibility
constraints for young and old agents may be written as,
(IC') e1t = e∗
(
s1t∆w1t + δ∆Ut+1
)
and ept = e∗
(
spt∆wpt
)
p ∈ {h, l}.
The population is large and so can be represented by a continuum with a measure normalized
to 2. Then, at each period, the proportion of old who were successful when young, denoted γt,
is equal to the probability µ(e1,t−1) that, in the previous period, a young agent had a high level
of performance. The feasibility constraint on status allocation is:
(F') s1t + γtsht + (1− γt)slt = 2 with γt = µ(e1,t−1).
Let c1t = (s1t, w1t,∆w1t) denote the contract of a young agent at date t, and cpt = (spt, wpt,∆wpt)
denote the date t contract for an old agent with performance p ∈ {h, l} at date t− 1. As in the
21In this specification, we do not allow income and consumption in a given period to differ. Our results below
would not be affected by introducing a credit market as long as workers do not have better access to that market
than the principal.
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static model the principal faces three types of constraints at each period: (F'), (IR'), (IC'). She
must pick the sequence of contract combinations < (c1t, cht, clt) > that maximizes intertempo-
ral profit subject to those constraints. The principal has the same discount factor as workers,
δ < 1, so that there is no exogenous bias against, or in favor, of delayed monetary rewards. Her
intertemporal profit may be written as:
+∞∑
t=0
δtEΠt =
+∞∑
t=0
δt
{
µ(e1t)
(
∆q −∆w1t
)− w1t + γt[µ(eht)(∆q −∆wht)− wht] (12)
+(1− γt)
[
µ(elt)
(
∆q −∆wlt
)− wlt]+ 2q
}
.
The initial conditions, γ0, ch0 and cl0, are given exogenously. Finally, we define a steady state as
a situation in which (c1t, cht, clt) is independent of time (i.e. all generations are offered the same
intertemporal contract).
We now show that viewing promotions as an instance of status differentiation among workers
yields valuable insights regarding their role in intertemporal incentive schemes.
3.2 Incentives and promotions
In view of the various constraints pertaining to the dynamic profit optimization problem, we
might expect that the exact nature of the solution will depend critically on which of these
constraints are binding. Although this is to some extent true, the results in the next proposition
are quite general.
Proposition 3 (incentives through promotion) Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, in any steady state
of a profit-maximizing solution, we have
s1 = w1 = ∆w1 = 0, (13)
sh > sl. (14)
wh ≥ wl and ∆wh ≥ ∆wl, (15)
where at least one of the inequalities in (15) is strict.
19
Proof : See Appendix A.
The above proposition provides a crisp characterization of the optimal intertemporal incentive
scheme. It is optimal to endow young agents with the lowest possible status level while providing
them with no direct monetary incentives.22 Junior workers earn the same salary independent
of their performance. They are induced to exert effort by the prospect of a future promotion.
That is, pay is attached to the job, and earnings profiles only become individual specific as
careers unfold. When old, an agent's status and monetary incentive scheme depend on her past
performance. As in the static context, it is optimal to combine higher wage and higher status.
However, in contrast with the egalitarian solution of Proposition 2, it is optimal to introduce
some differentiation between generations and among old agents. Better past performance brings
about higher status as well as greater monetary compensation. This solution allows advantage
to be taken of the complementarities between status and income by concentrating benefits in
both dimensions on one state of nature. This is reminiscent of the first-best solution in the static
problem where all of the status and wages are concentrated on one individual.
An important result in the literature on repeated moral hazard is that the optimal long-
term incentive contract should involve some memory: the type of incentives currently given
to an agent depends on her past performance (see for instance Rogerson, 1985, and Chiappori
et al., 1994). The idea is that, if agents are risk averse, it is optimal to spread the effect of
income shocks resulting from good or bad performances over time; this is the preference for
consumption smoothing emphasized by Malcomson and Spinnewyn (1988). This implies that it
is not optimal to delay all rewards and penalties as prescribed by Proposition 3. One obvious
difference between the model in this paper and the standard repeated moral hazard framework
relates to the agents' attitude towards income risk. We now briefly explore the robustness of our
results to the introduction of risk aversion in agents' preferences.
22As noted above, utility could easily be rewritten to allow for non-zero lower bounds (e.g., u(w, s, e) = (w +
1)(s+ 1)− ψ(e)). The important point is that there are such lower bounds.
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3.3 Robustness
In our treatment of risk aversion we will at the same time discuss the robustness of our results
to changes in the status technology. In the model considered here, the status constraint is linear
and utility is linear in status. This may loosely be interpreted as saying that there are constant
returns to concentrating status on one group of individuals. It might be expected that, if those
returns were sufficiently decreasing, the result that the young should have a minimal status
would be overturned. There are two possible ways of making the returns to status concentration
decreasing: either the left-hand side of the status feasibility constraint could be made strictly
quasiconvex or utility could be written as strictly concave in status. The second route is followed
in the argument below. Rewrite instantaneous utility as
u(w, s, e) = g(s)h(w)− ψ(e), s ≥ 0, w ≥ 0, e ≥ 0, (16)
where h and g are concave and strictly increasing functions satisfying h(0) = g(0) = 0.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the agent's instantaneous utility is linear in income (h linear) or
linear in status (g linear) and that there is sufficiently little discounting. Then in any steady
state of an optimal solution we have s1 = w1 = ∆w1 = 0.
Proof : See Appendix A.
The result that young agents should receive minimal status holds when either income risk
aversion is introduced or utility is strictly concave in status. Because earnings and status are
complements, individuals are willing to take gambles in which winners receive both higher in-
come and higher status. Becker, Murphy and Werning (2000) obtain related results in their
examination of the evolution of inequalities when individuals care about income and status and
the two are complements.23 Here the principal exploits the complementarity to elicit effort at a
lower wage cost.
23They do not consider the problem of moral hazard. They obtain the nice result that starting from different
distributions of wealth, society ends up with a unique unequal distribution.
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4 Job tenure and career profiles
Combining Propositions 2 and 3, our results suggest that an organization will resort to status
differentiation for incentive purposes only when it can set up an internal labor market (ILM) 24.
More specifically, in a long-term relationship, rewards for high performance are delayed over time
and pay rises are associated with changes in status, which are usually achieved by a move up the
hierarchy (i.e. promotion). Differences in productivity will then be reflected in wages for senior
employees only. That is, earnings profiles are upward-sloping and differences in earnings across
individuals widen with seniority. By way of contrast, if commitment is not possible, no status
differentiation occurs, and incentives are provided via direct monetary rewards. Employees with
different productivity are paid different wages, so that individual earning profiles diverge early
in the career. To assess the relevance of this theory, we now confront these predictions with a
number of stylized facts.
The feasibility of an internal labor market hinges on employees' expected tenure within the
organization. A comparison of work relations in the United States and Japan illustrates the two
situations of strong and weak commitment. According to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics the
average person in the US holds 9.2 jobs from age 18 to age 34. More than half of these jobs are
held between the ages of 18 and 24 (Department of Labor 2000). 25 By contrast in Japan labor
mobility is low for young core workers. For instance 3/4 of Japanese engineers will have only one
employer during their entire career (Jacobs and Herbig, 1998). Hashimoto and Raisian (1985),
using data from the 1960s and 1970s, indicate that in Japan 65% of male workers with at least
5 years tenure in the job when aged 20-24 will be in the same job 15 years later, compared to
an analogous figure of 30% in the United States. These differences have been remarkably stable
since the early 1970s.26
24According to Doeringer and Piore (1971) the main features of internal labor markets are: long-term employ-
ment relationships, limited port of entry for hiring, career paths within the firm and promotion from within.
25This does not mean that there is no internal labor market in the US. ILMs do exist and they are quite stable
(see Groshen and Levine, 1998). However they tend to begin late in the career (i.e., after age 35). As Farber
(1999) shows, most new jobs in the US end early, and the probability of a job ending falls with tenure.
26For updated data see Brown et al., 1997 p. 31.
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The analysis presented here implies that, when young, Japanese core workers will be at the
bottom of the hierarchy and receive relatively low wages, independent of their education level.
Differentiation comes later in the career so that the earnings profile increases with seniority with
increasing disparities between individuals. By contrast, in the US young workers, who are very
mobile, do not accept delayed rewards. Their earnings profiles are relatively steeper when young
(i.e. under 35). Earnings, which better reflect workers' productivity, are also more differentiated
by education. This implies that earnings disparities are greater for young workers in the US than
in Japan.
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, individual real earnings in the US increase
more rapidly when young than when old.27 Young American workers facing flat tenure-earnings
profiles change jobs to increase their earnings. Topel and Ward (1992) found considerable returns
to between-job mobility in a study of white male high-school graduates. The reverse is true
in Japan, where earnings profiles increase with age at an increasing rate. White-collar and
blue-collar pay tables are integrated into a single table that erases distinctions between the
two categories. There is also no major gap between production workers and craft workers. New
workers are placed at the bottom of the ability rank table and given simple assignments. (Brown
et al., 1997 pp 105). This implies that for young workers (i.e. under age 35) the level and variance
of earnings are low. As predicted by our theory, differentiation appears with seniority and pay
rises are coupled with changes in status. "Much of the career-based pay increases take place only
when, and if, workers are promoted to managerial positions that are not in the union, generally
after age 35." (Brown et al., 1997 p. 111).28 Figures 1 and 2, which are borrowed from Brown
et al. (1997) pp. 117 and 118, illustrate the results discussed above.
[Figures 1 and 2]
Figure 1 shows earnings by age and education in the automobile and electrical industries
27From the age of 18 to 24, real hourly earnings grow on average by 6.6 percent per year. This growth rate falls
to 4 percent between ages 25 and 29, and then to 2.4 percent between ages 30 and 34 (US Department of Labor
2000).
28University graduates may reach management in 10 years, typically by the time they are 35 to 40 years old.
High-school graduates may reach management in twenty two years, and most have reached management by age
50.
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in Japan and the US; Figure 2 presents earnings profiles by age and education at the national
level. In Japan differentiation in earnings appears after age 35, and the earnings gap between
different types of workers widens with age.29 In contrast, in the US earnings increase (sharply for
educated workers) in junior years but less so afterwards, and the earnings gap between educated
and less-educated workers widens up to age 35-39. As the industries here are fairly standardized,
this probably does not reflect any differences in technology, but rather different management
practices.
We have treated job mobility differences between these two countries as given, and argued
that they could explain differences in compensation policy in a way that is consistent with our
theoretical analysis. There could be any number of other underlying differences between the
two economies that we do not control for which might jointly explain both mobility differences
and differences in work compensation practices. Furthermore, our theoretical predictions are, in
some respects, similar to those resulting from other theories which try to explain internal labor
markets. In the next section we place our contribution in this existing literature.
5 Related work on internal labor markets
Our analysis provides a novel theoretical underpinning for understanding why promotions might
be preferable to direct monetary incentives, and also predicts how individual earnings profiles
over time are affected by the expected duration of the work relationship. Although these two
issues are closely intertwined, they have been to a large extent considered separately in the
existing literature.
The relationship between tenure and pay in internal labor markets has attracted a great
deal of attention. The use of large prizes attributed only at specific times over a career is often
interpreted as an attempt by firms to improve employee attachment (see for instance Becker,
1962, Salop and Salop, 1976, or Lazear, 1979). Lazear (1979) argues that firms that want to
invest in firm-specific human capital offer back-loaded compensation structures in order to retain
29This is true up until age 55. After this age companies encourage their workers to retire.
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their workers. In light of this theory, the different compensation policies in the US and Japan
might reflect greater investment in firm-specific human capital in Japanese than in American
firms. The interpretation proposed here provides additional insights in two ways. First, the firm-
specific human capital explanation establishes a causal link between commitment and delayed
monetary rewards. As delayed pay rises are a means of fostering commitment by employees, any
exogenous increase in this commitment will reduce the firm's incentive to delay rewards. The
firm-specific human capital hypothesis is thus inconsistent with the data if, as is often argued,
there are cultural reasons for the differences in job mobility for young workers in Japan and the
US. 30 Our analysis on the contrary assumes that commitment is exogenous but would also hold
were commitment to be induced by the prospect of garnering future rewards. Second, empirical
tests of the firm-specific human capital motive are at best inconclusive. Farber (1999) tries to
explain the high returns to tenure with this theory, but only finds little support for it. 31 By
way of contrast, our theory states that monetary rewards are delayed so as to match with the
change in status resulting from promotion, as this is the most cost-effective way of providing
incentives to young employees. We jointly explain the timing of monetary rewards and the use
of promotions as an incentive tool. As we argued above, the coincidence of pay increases with
promotions is a well-documented characteristic of Japanese ILMs.
The extensive use of promotions for incentive purposes has also been widely discussed in the
literature. Direct monetary transfers allow for fine tuning of the incentive scheme, contrary to
promotions which are discrete and irregular. One reason for the use of discrete incentive schemes
is that it is not always possible to assess absolute performance, whereas relative performances are
somewhat easier to evaluate. Promotions may then be viewed as prizes in a tournament between
employees, as in Lazear and Rosen (1981). This leaves open the question of why, in practice,
promotions involve both changes in status and pay rises, and why they are used so extensively
(and not only when absolute performance is unobservable). The theory presented here provides
30Hofstede (1980) identified four dimensions along which dominant patterns of culture can be ordered: power
distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity. He later added long-term orientation. Japan
scores higher than the US on all of these dimensions except for individualism.
31He concludes that the capital that accrues with tenure has a strong industry-specific rather than firm-specific
component. To the extent that this is the case, it is harder to argue that the accrual of firm-specific capital is
what drives the decline in the probability of job change with tenure.
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a link between wage profiles, hierarchical structure and tenure in firms.
Another way of linking the wage profile to the worker's position in the firm's hierarchy is to
think of promotions as a way of screening employees. Gibbons and Waldman (1999) propose
a model where there is no room for work incentives and workers' productivity is heterogenous.
Promotions are then used as a screening device to match more productive workers with tasks
where performance is more sensitive to productivity. They argue that their setting explains
many observed characteristics of compensation schemes, and notably the fact that pay rises are
larger when they coincide with promotion. These pay rises reflect higher productivity and would
not have occurred were the move up the hierarchy not to have corresponded to a change in the
individual's job. Yet, as Milgrom and Roberts (1992, Chapter 11) note, some companies such
as 3M or IBM have sought to avoid any conflict between the incentive and screening objectives
by creating separate career ladders for scientists and engineers, so that they can be promoted
without having to go into management. Similarly, faculty members in universities, or doctors in
hospitals are generally promoted without changing jobs. Furthermore, as Lazear (1991) points
out, when promotions do involve an actual change in the employee's tasks, the associated wage
increases are oftentimes out of proportion with any reasonable estimate of the rise in marginal
productivity associated with a job higher up in the firm's hierarchy. In our setting, promotions
involve no job changes, and the concentration of rewards towards the end of the career implies
that those who are promoted are paid above their marginal productivity. 32
One difficulty with using data on promotions to test this theory is that promotion systems
and hierarchies must meet various functional goals such as production efficiency and screening,
encouraging investment in firm-specific human capital as well as providing work incentives to
employees by creating stimulating career paths within the firm. These potentially conflicting
objectives lead to identification problems. It would therefore be extremely useful to appeal to
32In Auriol and Renault (2001) we investigate the implications of Proposition 3 for the specific shape of the
optimal incentive hierarchy, assuming that µ(e) = min{e, 1} and ψ(e) = A e2
2
. We find that the harder it is for
an employee to improve performance through effort (i.e., the larger is A), the more pyramid-like is the incentive
hierarchy. Indeed when A is very large success is rare; promotion is extremely prestigious and the associated pay
raise is huge (it diverges to infinity in the limit). On the other hand if high performance is easy to achieve, a
seniority-based promotion system may be optimal (i.e., everybody is successful and is promoted).
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different types of data to examine how status differentiation is used jointly with monetary rewards
to provide work incentives. For instance our results are consistent with the common practice of
offering executives a variety of perks. Rajan and Wulf (2004) use a panel of 300 publicly-traded
U.S. firms, over the period 1986-1999, to see whether perks (i.e., executive jets, chauffeur-driven
cars, and country club memberships) are managerial excesses, as generally argued in the corporate
finance literature, a strategy to minimize income tax liability, or rather are designed to enhance
managers' status or productivity. They find little empirical support for the tax explanation and,
at best, mixed evidence for the private benefit explanation. However, they do find that pay and
perks are positively correlated (even when controlling for firm size, industry and year), and that
larger, older, and more hierarchical organizations offer more perks. They also find that the more
productive employees at the top of a firm's hierarchy tend to receive more perks. They conclude
that perks may likely serve to enhance managers' status and firms' productivity. Oyer (2005),
focusing on broader types of benefits, argues that benefits may be motivated by productive
efficiency. For instance, company-provided meals or child-care services are found empirically to
enhance employees' effort. He explains this result via a process of substitution between domestic
tasks and work. Unfortunately he does not consider status. Additional insights could likely be
gained from the exploitation of large panels of firms and individuals such as that of the LEHD
program at the US Census Bureau described by Abowd et al. (2004). In particular, it would be
interesting to consider how personnel management practices differ across firms characterized by
different turnover rates, and thus different degrees of commitment. 33
6 Conclusion
The paper has argued that social recognition plays a major role in the work place. Social aspects
are all the more significant given that much of labor relations takes place outside of the market
and is medium to long term. Our analysis relies on the following two premises: recognition and
income are complements; and recognition is scarce because it is valued in relative terms. Our
33Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) provide evidence that different job reallocation rates across firms induce different
turnover rates, and that firms are very heterogenous with respect to job reallocation.
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main findings are that while it is costly to introduce differentiation between identical coworkers in
a static environment, such differentiation may prove to be a relatively powerful incentive device
in a dynamic setting. In the intertemporal incentive scheme, pay is attached to job, rewards
are delayed in time and higher income is associated with greater recognition. From an empirical
perspective the proposed framework yields predictions on the shape of the compensation scheme
in relation to the hierarchical structure in ILMs and spot markets. Stylized facts are consistent
with our results.
Our theoretical analysis predicts that internal labor markets are a superior mode of work
organization. If this is the case we may wonder why firms do not resort to them more system-
atically. This might not be always possible. To organize an internal labor market, firms need
not only commit to keep employees, but also be large enough or growing fast enough to propose
stimulating career paths. For firms in recession or in unstable economic environments flexibility
matters, so that commitment is not always possible. There will then be no benefit in creating a
hierarchical structure for incentive purposes. In recent years there has been a significant move
towards delayering in industrial countries. For instance Bauer and Bender (2001) examine on
a representative German employer-employee data set and reveal that between 1993 and 1995
50.73% of the 251 firms sampled reduced their number of hierarchical levels. In the same spirit,
using a panel of 300 US firms, Rajan and Wulf (2003) find that firms' depth (i.e., the number of
positions between the CEO and division heads) fell by more than 25% between 1986 and 1999. 34
According to our analysis, this may reflect a weakening of employer commitment, which could
itself be explained by an anticipated rise in the job loss rate. There is indeed evidence of such
an increase during the 1990s (see Farber, 1997).
34For instance General Electric (chemical division) cut the number of pay grades from 22 to 5 (Gerhart and
Milkovich, 1992).
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1 The proofs of conditions (i) and (ii) are straightforward: First note that,
for a given status level, si, total surplus is a strictly concave function of effort, which reaches a
maximum at e∗(si∆q). Thus if ∆wi > ∆q, total surplus may be increased by decreasing ∆wi.
Then profit may be increased while keeping the agents' utility unchanged by increasing wi. By
a symmetric argument, if ∆wi < ∆q and wi > 0, profit could be increased by increasing ∆wi
and decreasing wi.
Proof of condition (iii): First note that in the optimal incentive scheme we must have: (wi,∆wi) =
(0, 0)⇔ si = 0. Thus if si = 0 the result holds. Second, when sj > si > 0, we prove the result by
showing that if (iii) does not hold the principal can increase her profit by marginally decreasing
the status of agent j and increasing by the same amount the status of agent i while adjusting
their wages to exactly compensate for the change in utility.
Let φ be the composition of µ and e∗, φ = µ ◦ e∗. The probability µ being increasing and
concave in effort, φ is concave as long as e∗ is concave, which is the case under assumptions 1
and 2. This can be seen from
e∗′′(x) =
(e′)3[xµ′′′(e)− ψ′′′(e)] + 2(e′)2µ′′(e)
µ′(e)
. (A1)
Consider a change in status for some agent i by some amount  and consider changes in wages
that keep the agent's utility constant: since effort is chosen optimally by the agent, when taking
the derivative of utility with respect to  the envelop theorem implies that only the direct impact
of changes in status and wages need be considered. First suppose that wi > 0 so that, from
(ii), ∆wi = ∆q. Then let αi() be the low-performance wage that keeps utility constant. Thus
αi(0) = wi and the derivative of (si + )[αi() + ∆qφ((si + )∆q)] with respect to  must be zero
so that α′i() = −αi()+∆qφ((si+)∆q)si+ (where the derivative with respect to the term inside φ is
ignored due to the envelop condition on effort). If wi = 0 then utility may be kept constant by
setting the reward for high performance at a level βi() such that (si + )βi() = si∆wi. Hence
βi(0) = ∆wi and β′i() = −βi()si+ . Finally note that if we consider the profit generated by agent
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i's work, its derivative with respect to  evaluated at  = 0 is merely the change in the expected
wage bill α′i(0) or φ(si∆wi)β
′
i(0). In the former case, since ∆wi = ∆q, the effort level maximizes
profit subject to the individual rationality constraint and thus the envelop theorem applies. In
the latter case, there is no change in effort since (si + )β() is kept constant.
Now assume sj > si > 0. We show that profit may be increased by an  > 0 transfer of
status from j to i along with an adjustment in wages so that both agents' utility levels remain
unchanged. From (i) and (ii), if (iii) does not hold, three cases may arise.
Case 1: wi > wj > 0 (and ∆wi = ∆wj = ∆q). The derivative of profit with respect to 
evaluated at  = 0 is α′j(0)−α′i(0) = wisi −
wj
sj
+ ∆q
(φ(si∆q)
si
− φ(sj∆q)sj
)
. This derivative is strictly
positive because, φ(s∆q) being concave and equal to 0 when s = 0, φ(s∆q)s is decreasing in s.
Case 2: wi > wj = 0 and 0 < ∆wj < ∆wi = ∆q. The derivative of profit with respect to 
at  = − is β′j(0) − α′i(0) = wisi +
[φ(si∆q)∆q
si
− φ(sj∆q)∆qsj
]
+
[φ(sj∆q)∆q
sj
− φ(sj∆wj)∆wjsj
]
, which is
positive because φ(s∆q)s is decreasing in s, (see case 1) and φ(s∆w))∆w is increasing in ∆w.
Case 3: 0 < ∆wj < ∆wi ≤ ∆q. The derivative of profit with respect to  for  = 0 is
β′j(0) − β′i(0) =
[φ(si∆wi)∆wi
si
− φ(si∆wj)∆wjsi
]
+
[φ(si∆wj)∆wj
si
− φ(sj∆wj)∆wjsj
]
, which is strictly
positive because φ(s∆q)s is decreasing in s, (see case 1) and φ(s∆w))∆w is increasing in ∆w.
Finally, the if part of Condition (iii) does hold since if si = xj , the monetary incentive for
the two agents will be the same.
We prove Proposition 2 under the following assumption:
Assumption 3 The functions µ and ψ satisfy
ψ′′(e)
ψ′(e)
≤ −2µ
′′(e)
µ′(e)
. (A2)
Proof of Proposition 2. We have shown in the text, after Proposition 2, that if wi > 0 for some
i then all agents in the organization must have equal status, and thus by virtue of Proposition
1(iii), the same contract.
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Now consider agents for whom wi = 0 and (IR) does not bind. Setting the first derivative of
expected profit with respect to ∆wi equal to 0, the optimal solution ∆w∗(si) must satisfy
∂EΠ
∂∆wi
= sie∗′(si∆w∗(si))µ′(e∗(si∆w∗(si)))(∆q −∆w∗(si))− µ(e∗(si∆w∗(si))) = 0. (A3)
Applying the inverse function theorem, we have ∆w∗′(si) = − ∂2EΠ∂∆wi∂si / ∂
2EΠ
∂∆w2i
. The second partial
with respect to ∆wi is:
∂2EΠ
∂∆w2i
= s2i (∆q −∆w∗i )[e∗′′µ′(e∗) + (e∗′)2µ′′(e∗)]− 2sie∗′µ′(e?). (A4).
This is strictly negative if e∗ is concave, which is true by Assumptions 1 and 2. The cross partial
is
∂2EΠ
∂∆wi∂si
= (∆q −∆w∗i )
[
si∆w∗i
(
e∗′′µ′(e?) + (e∗′)2µ′′(e∗)
)
+ e∗′µ′(e∗)
]
−∆w∗i e∗′µ′(e∗). (A5)
The expression in (A5) is strictly negative if the expression in the bracket is negative. The
expression in the bracket is the derivative of γ(x) = xe∗′(x)µ′(e∗(x)) with respect to x = si∆w∗i .
Using the first-order conditions for optimal effort, we obtain that γ(x) = e∗′(x)ψ′(e∗(x)). Thus,
using (A1), γ′(x) = e∗′′ψ′(e∗) + (e∗′)2ψ′′(e∗) = (e∗′)2ψ′(e∗)
[
e∗′[xµ′′′(e∗)−ψ′′′(e∗)]
µ′(e∗) +
2µ′′(e∗)
µ′(e∗) +
ψ′′(e∗)
ψ′(e∗)
]
,
which is negative by Assumptions 1, 2 and 3. Hence the partial derivatives in (A4) and (A5)
have the same sign, so that ∆w∗′(si) < 0. Proposition 1(iii), combined with the fact that ∆w∗(s)
is strictly decreasing in s, implies that all agents with zero low-performance wage and for whom
(IR) is not binding must have identical status levels.
Finally suppose that there are two agents i and j with wi = wj = 0 and such that (IR) is
binding for i only. Then, from Proposition 1(iii), this can only be possible if si < sj . We have
shown above that ∂
2Π
∂w2i
< 0 so that profit is concave in ∆wi. Hence, since the (IR) constraint
for j is not binding, we must have ∆wj = ∆w∗(sj) which is optimal if the (IR) constraint is
ignored. Similarly, the (IR) constraint being binding for i implies that ∆wi > ∆w∗i (si) so that
∆w∗(si) < ∆w∗(sj) which contradicts our result above that ∆w∗ is decreasing in status. Thus
this situation can not be part of any optimal solution.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider a steady state. There then exists (c1, cl, ch) such that (c1t, clt, cht) =
(c1, cl, ch) for all t. The proof proceeds in three steps. Step 1: c1 = (0, 0, 0).
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If s1 = 0, then it is optimal to set w1 = ∆w1 = 0. Thus the proof of the result amounts to
showing that s1 = 0. Suppose to the contrary that s1 > 0. At some date t the principal may
switch to
c
′
1 = (0, 0, 0), c
′
h = (sh + s1,
δshwh + s1(w1 + ∆w1)
δ(sh + s1)
,
sh∆wh
sh + s1
),
c
′
l = (sl + s1,
δslwl + s1w1
δ(sl + s1)
,
sl∆wl
sl + s1
). (A6)
If each generation from t on is offered these contracts, the young's expected intertemporal
utility is held constant. Basically, the young's wages are transferred from the first to the second
period while being divided by the ratio of the original period 1 status to the new second period
status s1s1+sp , p ∈ {l, h}, so that the increase in status exactly compensates for the decrease in
income. The new intertemporal utility is
EU ′1 = −ψ(e1) + s1w1 + [1− µ(e1)]δ[−ψ(el) + slwl + µ(el)sl∆wl]
+µ(e1)[∆w1 + δ[−ψ(eh) + shwh + µ(eh)sh∆wh], (A7)
which is the intertemporal utility in the original contract. On the other hand, the utility of an
old agent is increased (by s1w1δ for the l type and
s1(w1+∆w1)
δ for the h type). Furthermore, all
effort levels are maintained. Finally, the intertemporal wage bill for each generation is lower:
that is (µ(e1)s1sh+s1 +
(1−µ(e1))s1
sl+s1
)Ew1+δµ(e1) shsh+s1Ewh+δ(1−µ(e1))
sl
sl+s1
Ewl < Ew1+δµ(e1)Ewh+
δ(1− µ(e1))Ewl. Hence, a steady state with s1 > 0 cannot be part of any optimal solution.
Step 2: If Uh > Ul, then (sh > sl) and (wh ≥ wl and ∆wh ≥ ∆wl) must hold.
First note that the arguments used to prove Proposition 1(iii) may be applied to the old pop-
ulation at each period so that (sh > sl) implies (wh ≥ wl and ∆wh ≥ ∆wl). Furthermore, if
Uh > Ul, we cannot have sl ≥ sh, since this would imply that wages for type l old workers should
be at least as high as those of type h old workers, which contradicts Uh > Ul.
Step 3: Uh > Ul.
Since young agents have no status, proving the result amounts to showing that a steady state in
which the young's effort is zero cannot be part of an optimal solution. In such a steady state, at
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each date, only the old exert effort. Now suppose that at some date t, the principal commits to
giving only half of the status to the old at date t+ 1. Then she is in a position to implement the
egalitarian solution of Proposition 2 which is optimal in the static problem. That is, all agents
can be awarded identical status and wages and they all exert the same effort: in particular young
agents are not induced to exert additional effort by the prospect of future utility differentials
since there are none. Since the solution in which only the old (i.e., one fraction of the agents)
exert effort is also feasible in the static problem, this yields a strictly lower per period profit than
the egalitarian solution. Thus the young's effort must be strictly positive in the steady state of
an optimal solution. Since the young exert effort in spite of zero status, we must have Uh > Ul.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider a steady state. An agent may face four possible states of nature
depending on her performance in each of the two periods (i.e., ll, lh, hl, hh). To simplify the
notation, the reference to the state of nature is dropped in the remainder of the proof. For one
such state of nature, let s1 and w1 denote the agent's status and wage when young, and s2 and
w2 the agent's status and wage when old. Let v = g(s1)h(w1) + δg(s2)h(w2). Now suppose that
s1 > 0. If the principal switches to a solution (s′1, w′1, s′2, w′2), with s′1 = w′1 = 0 and s′2 = s1 + s2,
v is unchanged as long as
h(w′2) =
g(s1)h(w1) + δg(s2)h(w2)
δg(s1 + s2)
. (A8)
It can easily be shown that if this is done for all states of nature, effort levels and intertemporal
expected utility are unchanged while the agent's utility when old increases. Suppose that h(w) =
w. Then (A8) becomes w′2 =
g(s1)w1+δg(s2)w2
δg(s1+s2)
. Since g is strictly increasing, the discounted wage
bill δw′2 is lower than w1 + δw2. Thus the principal is better off. Suppose that g(s) is linear.
Then (A8) can be written as
h(w′2) =
1
δ
s1
s1 + s2
h(w1) +
s2
s1 + s2
h(w2). (A9)
Strict monotonicity and concavity of h imply
h (w1 + w2) > h(
s1w1 + s2w2
s1 + s2
) ≥ s1h(w1) + s2h(w2)
(s1 + s2)
. (A10)
Thus, for δ close to 1, since h is strictly increasing, if w′2 satisfies (A9), then δw′2 < w1 + δw2.
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The figures are reprinted from Brown et al (1997) 
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Figure 2 
Earnings by Age and Education, 1990 
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